PARIKOIDES' WAY OF TRUTH AND B16
At least three interpretations have been given to B16 of Parmenides 1 poem. It has been taken for a fragment of his theory of knowledge, of his doctrine of sense percep-1 tion, and of his views on sensing and knowing. Evidence for these interpretations is taken from Aristotle's ffletaphysics and Theophrastus 1 De Sensibus. The fragment is usually assigned to the second part of the poem, the UJay of Seeming or Opinion.
In this study it mill be argued that B16 comes from the first part of the poem, the Way of Truth, and that it is a statement neither of a theory of knowledge nor of sense perception, but an affirmation of the close relationship 2 between thought and Being:
there can be no thought without that which is, or in Parmenides 1 words, "...neither can you recognize that which is not (that is impossible) 2 nor can you speak about it" (B2, 7-8) .
Regardless of the motives for the second part of Parmenides 1 poem, no guarantee of truth is given for its content. In B1, 28-30, for example, the goddess who is addressing Parmenides, invites him to inquire into the nature of truth, and the beliefs or "guesswork" of mortals:
\ I bid you to inquire into all things, both the steadfast heart of persuasive (well-rounded?) truth, and the opinions of mortals in which there is no · genuine conviction (πιστός αληθής ). 4 In B8, 50f. the goddess concludes the first part of her presentation, and introduces Parmenides to the UJay of Opinion:
I now cease my reliable discourse and reflection concerning truth. Henceforth you must learn the opinions of mortals, listening to the deceptive order of my words. contains a positive or reliable teaching, it should belong to the Way of Truth. The foregoing conclusion could be avoided, of course, if it b· «rgued that the UJay of Opinion ie partially true, a "likely story" designed to explain the world of appearance. For example, in ΒΘ, 60-61, Parmenides 1 goddess declares:
I tell you this arrangement (6 ιάκοσμον)» fitting in all respects ( έοικότα πάντα) so that no mortal will ever surpass you in opinion.
On the basis of this passage it has been maintained that the goddess is about to offer the best description of empirical reality, a description having a high degree of probability or likelihood of being true. Such an interpretation seems prima facie plausible, given the uiord έο ι,χότα . But on closer inspection, whatever the meaning of έο ικότα > the crux of these verses is found in BB, 61, and they cannot be interpreted to mean that the "arrangement" proclaimed by the goddess is the best and most probable account of the phenomenal world.
Verse 61 only means that the goddess will instruct
Parmenides so that no one can surpass him in mortal opinion concerning the uiorld. An interpretation of the UJay of Opinion as partially true or as a probable cosmology seems irreconcilable with the basic outlook of Parmenides 1 goddess for whom Being and non-Being, truth and falsity, always remain in sharp contrast.
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There are no degrees of reality for her and Parmenides.
Despite the fact that no truth is claimed for the For, claiming that non-being in contrast tq Being, does not exist, he thinks it necessary that Being be one and that nothing else be But being forced to conform to phenomena, and believing that these are one according to formula but many according to ssnsation, he now posits two causes or two principles, the Hot and the Cold, as if speaking of fire and earth; and he classifies the. Hot as the principle uiith respect to being but the Ĉ old as the principle with respect to non-being.
Since paucity, and even inaccuracy of Theophrastus 1 comments "j on B16, one does well beginning with Parmenides' igsissima. vsjba.
-^^^^-^^-·---····
In order to demonstrate the compatibility of B16 ujith the Way of Truth, the meaning of tiuo important terms must be determined, that Ϊ3,κρασιν βηαμελέων in the first verse.
If "limbs" is taken in its usual sense as the limbs of the human body, there seems little room for Theophrastus 1 interpretation that the krasis is a blend or 24 mixture of "hot" and "cold", or light and night.
The grammatical construction indicates that whatever the mea'ning of krasis, it somehow involves the limbs of the body; χραΟΊ,ν μ ελεών.
There are, however, two mays to avoid this conclusion.
One could deny that μέλεα refers to the limbs of the body, but instead to the elements of the 25 cosmos, the maxima membra mundi, light and night. Hence the mind is dependent on the mixture of the cosmic limbs.
The other argument shows that μέλεα refers to the human body.
But since all things consist of light and night (cf. B9), these are also the ingredients of the human body.
Hence the phrase should be interpreted as referring to a mixture of light and night which, in turn, 26 compose the bodily limbs.
But these two explanations ofμέλεα are not convincing.
Nowhere in the fragments does Parmenides refer to light and night as "limbs".
At best, these are the "shapes" or "forms" (μορφαί ) mentioned in ΒΘ, 53-54. li'hy does Parmenides not use this term in B16 if he wanted to say that men's minds are dependent f qn the mixture of light and night? Parmenides is normally very consistent in his terminology. The second possibility takes μέλεα in its common-meaning, but expects the reader to understand that, nonetheless, a mixture of light and night underlies the human limbs. This is stretching a point, for can it safely be assumed that all things, including the human body, are composed of light and night? Does the all in B9, for example, "since all things have been named light and night", refer to everything in the cosmos, or primarily to celestial phenomena? There is reason for thinking that light and night do not form the basis of all things in the way of Opinion, but that these are only 27 examples of difference or opposition. In general, it cannot be safely assumed either that rnelea means more than "human limbs" or that light and night are the underlying components of these.
But more important, xpactv μελέων makes perfectly good sense if the melea are the limbs of the hurpan body.
Various meanings of krasis are cited in Liddell and
Scott; for example, the temperament of the mind or body, temperature, harmony, union. Often the uiord refers to the mixing of mater and mine, not a random mixture, but one based on a certain proportion of mater to mine, usually Nor mould anyone mix mine (κεράσείε) first pouring it into the cup, but rather the mater and then the mine.
Similarly krasis sometimes appears in combination rnith Against the previous observations, it could be objected that interpreting κραο'ις μελέωνβε a may of saying that the limbs of the human body function harmoniously, is to reduce krasis to the level of a metaphor.
If ona keeps in mind, however, the meanings given in Liddell and Scott, it seems clear that krasis was not always under- The grammar of B16, 3-4 has been much discussed, but Taran, to some extend following HO'lscher, has given probably 32 the best and simplest explanation.
According to him, φύσις μελέων is the subject of φρονέει» and δπερ > accusative: the object of φρονέει . Since το αυτό is the subject of εστίν and όπερ is correlative with it, lines 3-4a can be translated:
For it is the same thing which the constitution (φύσις) O f each and every man's limbs thinks ...
The term φύσις in B16, 3 needs some explanation.
In a now old but important study, Περί φύσεως , U.A. Heidel argued convincingly that the primary sense of φύσις is "growth".
But according to him, it also has the sense of the end or result of a process.
Viewed from without, it is "the outward constitution or· frame of a thing"; considered fron 33 "it is its inner constitution or character."" Without pursu- If the previous observations are correct, it would seem that lines 3-4 further explain the relationship between mind and body suggested in 1-2: the krasis of the body which is similar in all men is dependent on the presence of mind. mind is the φύσις μελέων precisely in the sense that it enables the limbs to work together so that there can be a living, functioning body at all. And this mind which controls the body also thinks the "same thing" in all men: 13. As each man has a union of the much-wandering limbs of the body,so is mind present to men.
For it ie the eame thing which the constitution of the limbs (mind) thinks, both in each and every man.
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The word γαρ is often used to confirm or strengthen an assertion.
In this case, it suggests that the relationship between these verses is as follows: men have similar minds just as they have similar bodies, indeed it being the mind that governs the body.
That men's minds are similar is shown from the fact that they think the same object, the nature of this object being given in 4b.
The meaning of 4b το γαρ πλέον έθ"τΧ νόημα,
is not clear at first. Literally it can be translated, "for the full (or more) is thought." Taken in itself, of course, B16, 4b is an.incomplete statement, but since Parmenides claims that there can be no thought without that which is (non-Being is unthinkable, e.g. B2, 7-8), "the full" must be existence or Being: genuine thought is full of that which is.
There is, moreover, little doubt that 4b further emphasizes or clarifies "the same thing" of verse 2. UJhat is the "same thing" which the constitution or mind of all men thinks? The obvious answer is that which is or Being. All men, no matter how conceptually confused, think Being: "for you cannot recognize that which is not (that is impossible) nor could you express it," B2, 7-8. Likewise, the path of 14.
non-existence is "unthinkable and unnamable, for it is not a genuine way," B8, 17-18. This is the Parmenidean axiom, and any attempt to interpret B16 must consider this axiom.
Though it is dangerous to speculate in the absence of Parmenides 1 own ujords, the foregoing interpretation of B16 is not incompatible with the passage about the dead.
According to Theophrastus' report on this, the dead man does net perceive light or warmth since the fire has left him. It either exists or it doesn't exist: εστίν η ουκ εστίν.
•l'hy cannot this mind, despite its bodily associations, think that wnjch is? Parmenides' mind could and did even though it required divine aid.
In its entirety, B16 affirms a connection between mind and body, and a close relationship betuieen mind and
Being.
There is no explicit evidence either in the fragment itssif or in Aristotle's metaphysics"and Theophrastua'
De Sensibus that it came fruu. the Way of Opinion. He writes (p.58): "As to the place of fr. 16 we can by no means be sure that this really formed part of the doxa.
On the contrary, there are good reasons for holding that fr.16
belonged to the first part." ITly reasons for assigning B16
to the first part are, however, different. Moreover, we do not agree concerning particular details or the interpretation of Parmenides 1 poem as a whole.
3.
The expressions "that which is", "Being", and "existence" are used interchangeably in this study without any attempt to
give them a more precise meaning. "That which is" is a translation of the substantive participle το έόν used occas- But on the whole, Leonen's observation is correct:
If the arguments based on the philosophical meaning of the fragment as a whole are left out of account for a moment, it may safely be said that no conclusive philological arguments can be given for the correctness of any one of these readings. No one will therefore dispute that the decision which of these readings is the correct one has to be based on the interpretation.
Loenen, Parmenides, 51.
14. fflansfeld's objection to Loenen's discussion of the word is not completely accurate.
He It would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that this preponderance provides also the physical formula for the knowledge of Being.
No such formula could be given without translating Being into terms of Becoming...The mortal frame, gua mortal, cannot think Being.
Yet the "knowing man" can and does think it...To resolve this paradox is impossible, for it is only the epistemological counterpart of the ontological dualism of Being and Becoming.
But Vlastos 1 own proposal, that every true judgment of Being has as its basis not' only "more" light, but "all" light, seems, in fact, to be a translation of knowledge of Being into Becoming.
42.
There is no reason to think Parmenides would have denied the existence of the human body, and fallen into his own trap.
If Owen's interpretation of the poem is accepted, it is clear that the body exists for I can both think and speak about it. See foot no.te 3.
